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BREACHES OF THE N. B. MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 
AS GROUNDS FOR ACTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Introduction
The statutory requirements of the Motor Vehicle Act do not limit 
or interfere with the common law remedy for ncgligcncc, but they give 
other remedies directed to other ends. (1) Although it has been said 
that the Act is passed to insure the safety and protection of persons 
riding or driving upon the highwav, and gives a right of action to any 
such person who is injured bv reason of tlic non-ooservance of the re­
quirements of the statute, (2) it is submitted that this statement should 
be qualified somewhat.
The driver or rider of a vehiclc on the road may have observed the 
Motor Vehicle Act and all statutory regulations and still be guiltv of 
negligence. Again, although it is not quite clear, regarding the prov­
isions relating to pedestrians, (3) it cannot be supposed that the Act 
intended to make so important a change as to alter the common law, 
and make non-observance of these evidence of negligence. Further it 
should not be necessarv to show that failure to hold a license is not 
grounds for an action of negligence. (4)
The law relating to motor vehicles is largelv an application of the 
common law principles of negligence to conditions created by the 
motor vehicle. There is no doubt that a motor vehicle is essentially a 
machine that requires care in its operation if the rights of others are 
not to be invaded. The primary fluty of evcrv user is therefore to 
exercise reasonable care. Reasonable carc in this connection means 
the care which an ordinary skillful driver or rider would have exercised 
under the circumstances. “The law docs not require a supernatural 
poise or self control on the part of the driv er of a motor vehicle; and 
if some unforscen emergency occurs which would naturally overpower 
the judgement of an ordinary careful driver, so that lie fails to adopt 
the best course possible, he may not be negligent.” (5)
No rule is more frequently overlooked than the rule that the con­
duct of the person whose conduct is in question must be measured 
with regard to the circumstances as they existed at the time. “No case 
is to be treated as if the person whose conduct is under consideration 
were a Judge or juror sitting safely and comfortably in Court calmly
exercising his mind with the inquiry...........how the accident might
have been avoided; the difficulties of the situation in all respects must 
have due consideration. (6)
(1) See Sec. IS of the X eu ' linin.swick M otor I’e h ic le  A it . c. 20 o f 21 (ieo . I', IVJI.
(2) Stewart v. Steel 6 D .I..R . I
(3) See Sec. IOA and JOB. ibid .
(■/) Such provisions are regu la ted  by penalties.
(5) p er  Mas\en ] ., in Foster x>. Zax'itz. 2 J O .IV .X . 127 at I2S.
(6) p e r  M ered ith , C .J.C .P . in lilair v. ( i .T . l i .  I9 2 J . I D .l. li . 353 at 3 U .
W here ¿1 situation of danger arises the person in charge of ¿1 veh­
icle is called upon to (a) realize the danger, (b) determine upon ¡1 course 
of action, and. (c) act. Since the law docs not require supernatural 
poise or self-control, it is obvious that the length of time between the 
apprehension of danger ancl the physical action taken to avert injurv 
is ;i vcrv important clement in the inquiry, was due care exercised? (“ 1 
It is stated that the time reaction of the average driver is 2/t second.
W hen it is realized that a car travelling at 3S m.p.h. covers about 20.i 
feet in that time, it follows that the failure to avoid a danger which first 
appears at that distance ahead cannot be attributed to negligence. The 
Court of Appeal has placed the interval of time reaction at 1 to 2 
seconds. I nis time element often »lavs an important part as evidence 
to prove breaches of the Motor Vehicle Act.
Breach of Statutory Duties
The cases of liability arising out of a breach of statutory duty were 
classified bv W’illcs. J. (S) as follows: ‘"There are three classes of cases 
in which a liability mav be established founded upon a statute. One 
is. where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability 
is affirmed bv a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of rem­
edy different from the remedy which existed at common law: there, 
unless the statute contains words which expressly or bv necessary im­
plication exclude the common law remedy, the partv suing has his elec­
tion to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The sccond class 
of ease is. where the statute merely gives the right to sue. but provides
110 particular form of rcmcdv: there, the p;irtv can only proceed bv 
action at common law . But there is a third class, v iz., where a liability 
not existing at common law is created bv a statute which at the same 
time giv es a special ancl particular rcmcdv for enforcing it.”
There i' 110 doubt that the Motor Vchiclc Act creates a duty.
The dutv of a person who drives or rides a vehicle on the highway is 
to use reasonable care to avoid causing damage to persons, vehicles or 
property of am kind on or adjoining the highway. Reasonable care
111 this connection means the care which an ordinarily skilful driver 
or rider would have exercised under the circumstances. The steps to 
be taken to perform this dutv of hiking reasonable care have been 
laid down 111 a more detailed form in several sets of circumstances 
which are of constant occurrence.
The violation of or non-compliance with the provisions of the 
Motor Vchiclc Act arc deemed an offence ancl penalties arc prov ided. (9)
If the Act was to prov ide these penalties and these alone, it might be 
that this would be the onlv rcmcdv under the third class of liability 
stated bv W'illcs J. But bv Section 48 of the New Brunswick Act, 
common law rights arc not affected.
(7) SVr ClnMoii I l .( . .  a, /;. / I I I .  H v.. 12 O.M ..Y. 2<ti nl 2*7
I.V) H  n h ' r i  l i i u i i / i I i i i i  \ r , r  II ill  i t  w o r k s  l . u .  i'. I  l n w k r \ l n i i i l  I S ' 11, ft ( . 11.  ( i i .s .)
l i f t .  I f f ,
i f>) Sr r  Si t .  ft i  7 ’ . Wuli i i  I i l i i r l r  A i l  <</ Y./>‘.
...........
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“See. 48. Nothing in this act shall be construed to affect 
the common law right of any person to prosecute or 
defend a civil action for damages by reason of injuries to 
person or property resulting from the negligent use of 
a public highway t>v any person operating a motor vehicle.
This seems to answer that pertinent question, is the person bring­
ing the action one whom the statute desired to protect? The statute 
may have been designed to protect a particular class of persons, but this 
is not essential in order to give a right of action. “ l'hc question is 
not to be solved by considering whether or not the person aggrieved ^  
can bring himself within some special class of the community or 
whether he is some designated individual. The duty may be of such 
paramount importance that it is owed to all the public. It would be 
strange if a less important duty, which is owed to a section of the 
public, mav be enforced by an action, while a more important duty 
owed to the public at large cannot. The right of action docs not 
depend on whether a statutory commandment or prohibition is pro­
nounced for the benefit of a class.” (10) Section 48 provides that 
the common law right applies to any person notwithstanding a penalty 
for violation of the provisions, as provided bv sections 6~> to 75 of 
the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act.
The Extent of Statutory Duty Under Motor Vehicle Act
Salmond on Torts (11) says with regard to the breach of statut­
ory duties, that the breach of a duty created by a statute, if it results 
in damage to an individual, is prima facie a tort for which an action 
for damages will lie, but the question in every case is one as to the in­
tention of the Legislature in creating the duty. Prima facie, persons 
for whose benefit an Act is passed, have a right of action for damages 
for its breach causing them injury, but on the true construction the 
Act may not intend a remedy to the individual or it may provide a 
special remedy, the nature of which indicates that no right to the in­
dividual was intended. And then the learned author said that it also 
is a question of construction whether liability is absolute or depends on 
wrongful intent or negligence, and he quotes Brett L.J. as follows: (12)
“W here the language used is inconsistent with either view, 
it ought not to be so construed as to inflict a liability 
unless the party sought to be charged has been wanting 
in the excrcisc of due and reasonable care in the per 
formance of the duty imposed.,, 4
(10) p e r  A tkin 1 ..J., in P hillips  i'. Ilrita nnic H y g en ic  ¡.a u n d ry  Co., 1923, 2 K .l). S12
(11) 7th edit, at p . 635.
(12) H a m m o n d  u. Vestry o f St. P ancras, 1874 L .R . 9  C .P. 316.
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Other authors have said that the breach of a statutory regulation 
is usuallv prima facie evidence of negligence. (13) Shearman and 
Red field on Negligence (6tli edition), referring to American decisions 
stated:
"It  seems to us that the true rule is, in all such cases, 
that the violation of such a statute or ordinance should 
a I wavs be deemed presumptive evidence of negligent c 
which if not excused by other evidence including all the 
surrounding circumstances should be deemed conclusive.” 
Charlcsworth in his book on Negligence (14) refers to what 
Crccr L. J. said about the Knglish Road Traffic \ct, 1930: "T he code 
is not binding as a statutory regulation; it is only something which 
may be regarded as information and advice to drivers. It docs not follow 
that, if tlicv fail to earn out that which is prov ided for b\ the code, 
they arc ncccssarilv negligent. It onl\ provides that the\ may be 
found negligent if tlicv do not cam  out the provisions of the code. 
Nor is it sufficient excuse for them to sav, in answer to a claim for 
negligence: “W c did everything that is provided for in the code.”
McCardic J. delivering a judgment in the case of Phillips v. 
Britaiuia llvgienic Laundry Com pa m lim ited (IS) stated:
‘ I agree, however, that the breach of a statutorv regulation 
will usuallv afford prima facie evidence of negligence.
I he v iew I am now expressing seems to accord with the 
opinion of the Div isional Court and the Court of Appeal 
in W intlc v. Bristol Tramwavs and Carriage Co. (16) 
namclv that the Motor Car Acts and Regulations do 
not in themselves set the standard of care required for 
the purpose of civil actions. If we were to approve the 
plaintiff's submission here that the defendant s dutv is 
absolute, a stranger would possess a greater right to care 
than is possessed bv a passenger for reward against a
person driving him ........... It must be remembered that
the common law gives a person injured an ample meas­
ure of protection bv virtue of the legal rules as to neg­
ligence and nuisance. A high degree of care is required 
from those who drive motor cars. I respectfully agree 
with the view expressed bv the late Mr. Bevcn in his 
well-known work on Negligence. (17) lie  there savs 
(after referring to the Motor Car Acts and Regulations): 
“These alterations in the law, while they permit the use 
of motor cars and regulate their uses, arc directed to the 
public ancl police aspects of the case, and do not affect 
individual rights or remedies.” ........... In every case, 1 bc-
(/> ) I'ttlloih, (iiblts.
(N )  At /Mf>r 6S. IV),S.
(/*) /V??, I A.//.
(If>) IV I6, lh<> I I .  1 2* : 1917. 117 I I .  21s
(17) ltd  rd il. ¡'til. I. jt. III).
\
licvc the allegation has been that of negligence, and the 
breach of a statutory regulation has been alleged not as 
a cause of action in itself, but as evidence of a breach of 
the common law duty to take due ca re .. .  .If the legislat­
ure desires to cast an absolute duty on motor car owners 
the purpose should be affected by plain words in an Act 
of Parliament, and not bv a somewhat obscure regulat­
ion of a police character/’
W e should not lose touch with the New Brunswick Motor V eh­
icle Act. The latest decision on the subject (18) makes it dear that a 
breach of the statutory regulations is only prima facie evidence of 
negligence and “unless such negligence was an effective cause of the 
damage., it would not create liability on the part of the defendant.” (19) 
The learned judge said that the rule governing the case is clcarlv stat­
ed by Viscount Hailsham in the Swadling v. Cooper. (20) where he 
says:
My Lords, the law in these collision cases has long been 
settled. In order to succeed the plaintiff must establish 
the defendant was negligent and that that negligence 
caused the collision of which he complains. If it is 
established from his own evidence, or bv evidence adduc­
ed on behalf of the defendent that the plaintiff could have 
avoided the collision by the exercise of reasonable care, 
then the plaintiff fails, because his injury is due to his 
own negligence in failing to take reasonable care.”
Then quoting from Gibbs, (21) the learned judge goes on to 
say that although dv statute, road users may be enjoined or forbidden 
to do certain acts, it does not follow that they will be civilly liable 
for a collision resulting from a breach of such statutory duty.
At this point then, we have arrived at the crux of the matter. 
As the trial judge remarked in the case of Chapman v. Wilson (22) 
referring to the provisions of a Motor Vehicle Act: “A breach of a 
by-law of a statutory provision does not of itself constitute neglig­
ence. It is evidence or negligence — it is only evidence of negligence 
—and it is prima facie evidence of negligence which casts upon the 
person who has been shown to have violated the by-law, the onus of 
satisfying vou that notwithstanding that the conditions were such 
that the non-observance of the by-law or of the statute was not in point 
of fact negligence.” Again in Webster v. Gelinas, (23) Hogg J. quot­
ing from Mr. Justice Davis in his decision in Falsetto v. Brown, (24) 
where he said:
(18) I .eb la n c  x>. S .M .T . 23 M .P .R . 14*.
(19) p e r  H arrison  / .  at p . 1 55.
(20) 1931 A .C . 1 at p. 8.
(21) Collisions on L a n d , 5tli edit. p . 6.
(22) 1930 1 M .P .R . at p .
(23) 1941 4D .1 ..R . 4 9 5 at 496  - 7
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“ I lie plaintiff, then, in an action such as the present 
w here there is no statutory onus upon the owner or driver, 
must allege and prove negligence in the operation of the 
motor vehicle that caused tlie loss or damage sustained, 
and it is not sufficient merely to set up and rely upon a 
breach of a statutory duty................it was not the intent­
ion of the Legislature that everyone injured through a 
breach of am statutory requirement should have a right 
of civil action against the owner for damages.”
Hogg J. goes on to sav that "the Act establishes very many rules 
of the road to be observed bv the drivers of motor vehicles. But a 
breach of the Act must be a proximate cause of the injury complained 
of to render a person liable for damages." In other words the defend­
ant mav be responsible in damages because of a violation of a section 
of the statute, if there is negligence, and the violation causes or partially 
causes the accident.
I'hus where A occasions damages to B in a motor vehicle collision. 
The plaintiff B in his action for damages for ncgligcncc must (a) prove 
the facts, (b) showing a breach of the statute (25) and (c) damages 
resulting as proximate cause of such breach. Then the onus of explan­
ation is cast on the defendant A, who in the absence of explanation 
shall be held negligent.
Following two Canadian cases, (26) it was held that such onus 
of explanation is merely to give an explanation which is consistent 
cither with negligence or with no ncgligcncc, and if lie gives such an 
explanation, the onus is on those who assert that he was negligent to 
establish the fact. However the defendent must give an explanation, 
for prima facie cvidcncc, if there is 110 ev idence to meet it, becomes 
conclusive evidence and justifies a finding of guilt or a verdict for the 
plaintiff, when the accused or defendant offers 110 evidence to meet it.
Causa Causans
Negligence, to give rise to a cause of action, must be the real or 
proximate cause of the damage complained of.
A car carrying a quantity of liquor came into contact with a motor 
truck driven bv an unlicensed driver. “The illegality of the conduct 
of both parties was not the cause of the accident." but as both were 
driving negligently, neither could recover. (27) "The cardinal prin­
ciple in the law must be causa causans of the loss or damage suffered 
bv the claimant. I lie mere fact of ncgligcncc of a person docs not
(21) nni, ? i).1 .11. i 17.
(2*) A ln ctn h  nl this du ly  o a  ti\i<iiiiii£ thu/m gr will iw lnhlnh n /n in m  /</</< him
11I nrii/ignitc.
(2h) ( i i i u l l u n  k  (.11. 1'. I lie k i n g .  IV I*  V (../>. I l > ; \ l i i ln n r n \ \  I III. .\ >/»//»(»».
I VIS O.lt. Ihti.
(27) lliniiii v. Ihmol, IV o il .X. ISO.
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necessarily result in liability in law on the part of that person.” (28) 
Thus, if the negligence of the defendant did not cause or contribute 
to the cause of the plaintiff’s damage, but such damage was in fact 
caused solely by the plaintiff, there would be no liability in law on the 
part of the defendant for such damages. Conversely, if the negligence 
of the defendant was the sole cause of the plaintiff’s damage, the fact 
that there was some negligent act or omission on the part of the plain­
tiff is not sufficient in law to impose on the plaintiff any part of the 
responsibility or liability for the accident or damages resulting there­
from. (29) '
The recent case of Fuller v. Nickle (30) illustrates the principle 
of causa causans. In this case, there was a collision at night between 
the appellants’ truck and a car driven by the respondent. The whole 
left side of the car was practically ripped off by contact with the over­
hanging box of the truck. The truclc was not equipped with the clear­
ance lights required by the law and was 3*/2 inches wider than the legal 
width. The trial judge found that the respondent had not discharged 
the onus of showing that the infraction of the law contributed to the 
accident or that the appellant was otherwise guilty of negligence which 
was the causa causans. The Court of Appeal reversed this judgment 
and found that the probable cause of the accident was the absence of 
clearance lights, coupled with the illegal width of the truck. In the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the decision of the trial judge was restored. 
“'I ne appellants’ infractions of the Vehicles and Highways Traffic Act, 
both in failing to display clearance lights and having upon his truck 
31/2 inches extra width, may justify tne imposition of penalties, but 
in fixing the responsibility for a collision in an action between parties 
they are important only if they constitute a direct cause of that 
action.” (31)
There are many cases on this point of law which show that a 
violation of a specific provision of the Motor Vehicle Act does not 
necessarily constitute an act of negligence. It would be absurd to 
hold that the breach by a motorist or a statutory duty to have a red 
light in the rear of his motor vehicle would be a ground for an action for 
damages by a person who collided with the front of the car. In the 
case of Godfrey v. Cooper, (32) the plaintiffs were passengers in a 
jitney driven by F  and injured in a collision with the defendant’s motor 
car, negligently. F  had no license to drive his car, although he was 
required to have one by the Act. The defendants claimed F  was 
illegally on the highway, and the plaintiffs had no cause of action. 
Held that F ’s failure to procure the license was not shown to have 
caused the accident, and the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed. In
(28) Sm ith T ran sp ort L td . v. S h u rtlef), 1948 O .W .K . 412.
(29) See A n d rea s  v. C .P .R . Ry. 1905, 37 S .C .R . 450.
(30) 1949, S .C .R . 450.
(31) p e r  hstey J .  See also City of V ancou ver v. B u r  ch ill, 1932 S .C .R . 620.
Fo rbes v. Coca Cola Co. o f C an . & G u itea u  1941 3 W '.W .R. 909.
(32) 51 D .I..R . 455.
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another ease. (33i failure to sound the horn in breach of the Act was 
not the cause of the accident, when the plaintiff driving a team saw 
the motor car approaching, and the horn, if sounded could have done 
no more than warn plaintiff of the approach. If it is the proximate 
cause however, as where the plaintiff’s car was not equipped with an 
adequate mirror, and that absence of the mirror was not only contribut­
ing. but a proximate cause of the collision, judgement must be for the 
defendant, (34)
In all actions of tins tvpc, it is the proper question for the jury 
whether the damage was occasioned cntirclv bv the negligence or im­
proper conduct of the defendant, or whether the plaintiff himself so 
far contributed to his misfortune bv his own want of ordinary care 
that but for such want of care the misfortune would not have happened.
It must be remembered that as in the ease of negligence, a cause which 
is mcrelv a sine qua non does not establish contrioutorv negligence. (35)
Contributory negligence does not applv where there is ultimate 
negligence. This conclusion is supported bv very high authority in 
an Admiralty case, where it is said per Viscount Birkenhead, L. C.
Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Volute (1922) 1 A C . 12() at p. 136:
“A is suing for damage. . . .  I le was negligent, but his negligence had 
brought about a state of things in which there would have been no 
damage if B (the defendant) had not been subsequentlv and scvcrablv 
negligent. A recovers in full.”
It is at this point then that we must deal with the question of 
ultimate negligence. W here both are negligent, the v ital question is, 
whose negligence is last in point of time. In the case of Hanley v.
Hayes, (36) where two vehicles were coming to an intersection, it was 
pointed out bv Mastcn J. A. (37):- “ If he had exercised reasonable 
precaution as to speed and observation, he could have checked his car. 
or have swung to the left, in time to have averted the accident.
Instead........... he veered to the right. He was. therefore............ guiltv
of ultimate negligence.”
W hen an emergency, arises bv reason of the negligence of one 
party, a new dutv is cast upon the other to do his best to avoid the 
consequences of the initial negligence. If there is a brcaeh of that 
duty, and disaster results, it is attributed solely to his failure Ilis 
ultimate negligence is the sole cause of the disaster, and he must 
assume the whole responsibility. But it is onlv where a clear line can be
( I I )  I n i h r  \ i>. (.<)< ( . i t . .  /'>//, 1 II . II".//. m>'>: n l s u  M m  I i n  •,*. l i u l / i l i ,  S7 /)./..//.
W,S'. 77/rv* ruses m i  in il l in r ily  jm  l l ir  l ir in c ib lr  llm l n t le f r n d r n l  tt in n o l  
r e ly  ii/m n  n b r e a c h  t>\ lln  In ot'is ion s  ul the i' e h ic lc s  At I o il l l i c  /m il  o / l l ir  
l> lniiilill itn ltw  l l ic  I n m t l i  m il In slm w ii In lir l l ir  / n o M iiiillr  m u s e  ul l l ir  
in i u l  m l .
» ? ' )  Mi I iiiiglilin l o n g .  I ’>27. -  I ) . 1 .1 ! .  I S 6 ;  see n l\n llir j  'm um s C on tributory  
\ e g lig e n c c  At/s  /or lln  njijiniliiDiniriil u\ low m i a id in g  to d e g ree  ol limit.
(16)  1 0 2 1 . 1 1 ) 1 . 1 ! .  7S2.
<17) I h i t l  11. J.V v
(J.V) fin nr I I I.C. r ’2(< / l ) l i ;  0.V6 _________________ I ̂ ——1 " " 1,11....~ j ***—» - «
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drawn that the subsequent negligence depends upon the fact that one 
party had a chance (the last clear chance) to avoid the injurious con­
sequences, and failed to make use of it, either due to further negligence 
at the moment, or to the operation of an act of negligence already 
committed, but the effect of which was continuing.
However, 110 matter what it is called, <‘efficient,’ or “effective cause,” 
“real cause,” “proximate cause,” “decisive cause,” “immediate cause,”
“causa causans,” ........... the object of the inquiry of the accident is a
search to find the responsible agent. (39) Very often it is more con­
venient to begin at the accident, and work back along the line of events 
which led up to it in order to fix upon some wrong doer the responsibil­
ity for the wrongful act which has caused the damage.
It is submitted that the statutory requirements of the Motor 
Vehicle Acts do not limit or interfere with the common law remedy 
for negligencc. Also that the Motor Vehicle Acts simply regulate 
the standard of earc at any given time. Thus the Acts impose a duty 
011 the driver of .1 motor vehicle to comply with the regulations laid 
down, but this still leaves upon every driver a common law duty of 
taking appropriate action outside the Motor Vehicle Act in circum­
stances wnerc it becomcs essential in the interest of safety. In such 
circumstances where it may be reasonable to depart from tiie ordinary 
rule of the road, it will throw the burden of proving such circumstances 
upon him, the driver who has departed from the ordinary rule. For 
example, where vehicles A and B approach each other from opposite 
directions on the same side of the road, A on its proper side and B on 
the wrong side, and when collision is imminent, A swerves to its wrong 
side, B at the same time swerving to its right side causing a collision, 
B is liable to A. (40)
If the driver of a motor vehicle fails to observe the provisions of the 
Motor Vehicle Act relating to the standard of care in driving, (41) 
or equipment requirements, (42) and is involved in an accident while 
such violation of the Act is continuing, can it be said that the breach or 
breaches of the Act is ground for an action of negligence? W e have 
found that such breach is prima facie evidence of negligence. Prima 
facie evidence is sufficient to establish a fact, or to raise a presumption 
of fact until rebutted. It must be remembered however that three 
things are necessarv in order that the plaintiff should recover, and it 
is necessarv for the judge or jury to decide: (1) W hether the defendant 
has failed to observe tlie duty imposed on him by the statute. (2) 
W hether such failure was the direct cause of the injury of which the 
plaintiff complains. (3) The damages resulting from such injury suf­
fered by the plaintiff.
(39) B .C . E lectric  Ry. C. L td . v. Loach (1916) 1 A C . 719 P  C. p er . cu r . 7 2 5 - 6 - 7
(40) W allace t>. B er lin s  1915 S.C. 205.
(41) Sections 37 , 3S, 39, 42 of N .B . M otor V ehicles Act c. 20 o f 24 C eo . V.




It is reasonable to believe that a breach of the Motor Vehicle 
Act in no wav related to a collision will not be grounds for an action 
of negligence. I'or if there is no causal connection between the neg­
ligence and the damage there is no evidence of negligence to go to 
the inn. Here it should be noted that when there is a violation of 
the Motor Vehicle Act in the “agonv of collision, the motorist is not 
liable even though there is a causal connection in the breach of the 
Act and the damage. "The plaintiff has no right to complain if in 
agonv of the collision the defendant fails to take some step which 
might have prevented a collision unless the step is one which a reason­
ably careful man would fairly be expected to take in the circum­
stances. (4>) This is also true in the case of pure accidents, where 
for example, a car driver suddenly becomes unconscious and falls down 
on the floor of the car. and the car. left without any guidance runs 
over the sidewalk and injures a pedestrian. (44) Kxccpt for these two 
cases, it mav be said that if the driver of a motor vehicle violates the 
provisions of the Motor Vchicle Act relating to the rules of the road 
and equipment requirements, and such breach of dutv is the direct 
cause of the damages to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff has a good 
ground or basis of action for damages in negligence. If there is no 
causal connection between the breach of the Motor Vchicle Act and 
the damage there is 110 cvidcncc of ncgligcncc to go to the jury.
It would seem therefore, that the law has worked out definite 
rules which must be complied with, and these rules represent the legal 
standard of carc. These rules vary from time time as social conditions 
and habits of life varv. (4^)
The reasonable man who drives a motor vchicle has the skill of 
a competent driver, lias complete knowledge of the Motor Vehicle 
Act and the various statutory regulations dealing with the driving 
of motor cars, and complies with them. He knows that such rules arc 
for his own benefit and the benefit of the general public. It the 
motorist violates them he, will be penalized by the State, and if his 
violation causes injury to another person or person's property, he will 
be liable unless lie can explain the prima facie cvidcncc of negligence. 
Anv such ncgligcncc will be determined b\ an action in torts for dam­
ages, with the standard of carc laid down bv the Motor Vehicle Acts.
—bv C. T . Gilbert.
Ottawa
( V/ l  (.ootson v. H. I (>l7 /•\. ‘i l l .  See also H utkley tuitl Toronto litin sjio il
C.omm. i’. Sm illi T  run sport IVIh (¿ .l{. 7 (,S.
( / *)  A lthou gh  bretithes oj the M otor I ’eliitle  At I do not in them selves iietih  
gro u n d s jot tin tit I ion t>l negligent e . yet those provisions o f the At I w hich  
tlenl u'illt in les of the itmtl, nntl vary from  lim e lo tim e, limy n ettle  lia b il­
ity w h ere n o ne existed  til com m on hue. That is lo sny lliey e n h n g t  th e  
field of retisonnble cure.
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